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Criminal Law
by Laura D. Hogue*
and Franklin J. Hogue"
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Authors reviewed the most important criminal cases during this
reporting period-from June 1, 2011 through May 31, 2012'-that will
likely have an effect upon the way prosecutors and defense attorneys
approach criminal cases in Georgia.
II.

BOND

Section 17-7-50 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)
requires that any arrested person who is denied bail have his or her case
presented to a grand jury within ninety days of confinement.3 Bail
must be set by the court should the accused fail to be indicted within
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1. This Survey chronicles developments in Georgia criminal law from June 1, 2011, to
May 31, 2012. For an analysis of Georgia criminal law during the prior survey period, see
Franklin J. Hogue & Laura D. Hogue, CriminalLaw, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 63
MERCER L. REV. 119 (2011).

2. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-50 (2008).
3. Id.
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this timeframe.4 In Tatis v. State,5 the defendant, in an attempt to
avoid arrest, broke both of his ankles and found himself under arrest
and handcuffed to a stretcher at Grady Memorial Hospital. Here, the
defendant remained (handcuffed and guarded by sheriff's office
personnel in an area of the hospital containing jail cells) for two days
before he was transferred to the Fulton County Jail. Ninety-two days
after police handcuffed Tatis to i stretcher and kept watch over him in
the hospital, but within ninety days of6 his transfer to jail, Tatis was
indicted by a Fulton County grand jury.

Tatis filed a motion for a reasonable bond to be set pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-50, arguing that, for the purposes of the statute, the
defendant's "confinement" began when police handcuffed him to the
stretcher at the hospital. The State argued, and the trial court agreed,
Tatis's confinement began when he arrived at the Fulton County jail.7
The Georgia Supreme Court agreed with the defense and held that the
word "confinement" to mean "restraint" and to encompass a situation
like that of the defendant in this case, where a person is handcuffed to
a stretcher at a hospital and watched by a police guard. "'[Confinement' is a situation in which the defendant may not leave official
custody of his own volition; a situation where one is under arrest and in
a facility pursuant to governmental authority where he is guarded or
restrained in some manner." Accordingly, the supreme court held that
the defendant's confinement began ninety-two days before his indictment
and that the trial court erred in failing to grant a reasonable bond. 10
"[Tihis case make[s] clear that while one who is incarcerated is in
confinement under [O.C.G.A.] § 17-7-50, one need not be incarcerated to
be confined under [O.C.G.A.] § 17-7-50.""

III. PRESERVATION OF EVIDENCE
In October 2007, Daniel Stephens died in a single-car accident. Police
released the other occupant of the car, Avon Mussman, believing he was
a passenger and, thus, not responsible for the accident. Police impounded the car, removed samples of biological material, and released the car

4. Id.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

289 Ga. 811, 716 S.E.2d 203 (2011).
Id. at 811-13, 716 S.E.2d at 204-05.
Id. at 812, 716 S.E.2d at 204.
Id. at 813, 716 S.E.2d at 205.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 814, 716 S.E.2d at 205.
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to a towing company." Through the evidence taken from the car, the
medical examiner and investigating offieer concluded the deceased,
Stephens, was the passenger and Mussman was the driver. Mussman
was indicted for vehicular homicide in July 2008. Mussman sought
suppression of the evidence which was denied by the trial court.13
In Mussman v. State, 4 the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court's denial of Mussman's motion to suppress evidence or dismiss
the indictment, which Mussman made because the car had been sold and
was no longer available for Mussman to inspect and independently
examine. The court of appeals held that the State's failure to preserve
the car for inspection by the defense was a constitutional violation of the
defendant's due process rights and that the State had violated O.C.G.A.
§ 17-5-56(a). 15 O.C.G.A. § 17-5-56(a) states, in effect, that governmental entities in possession of physical evidence containing biological
material shall maintain that physical evidence. 6 According to the
court of appeals, law enforcement must not only maintain the1 7biological
samples but also the "container" or "source" of the material.
The Georgia Supreme Court reviewed this holding in Mussman to
determine (1) whether the court of appeals's interpretation of O.C.G.A.
§ 17-5-56(a) was in error, and (2) whether the court of appeals's holding
that the State committed a due process violation for failure to preserve
evidence was in error." The supreme court reasoned that the plain
language of the statute does not require the State to maintain all
"containers" and "sources" but rather simply the contents that, in the
words of the statute, "relate to the identity of the perpetrator of the
crime." 9 The court noted, "[tihe evidence rooms maintained by law
enforcement... would need to increase in capacity to unimaginable and
unwieldy levels in order to accommodate the assortment of household
objects, vehicles, and other 'sources' of biological evidence that might be
of 'conceivable evidentiary significance' to the defense . . . ."

The

12. State v. Mussman, 289 Ga. 586, 587, 713 S.E.2d 822, 823 (2011). The car was
subsequently purchased by a salvage wholesaler who sold the car to a salvage company in
Quebec about six months before Mussman was indicted. Id.
13. Id. at 587-88, 713 S.E.2d at 823-24.
14. 304 Ga. App. 808,697 S.E.2d 902(2010), rev'd, 289 Ga. 586, 713 S.E.2d 822(2011).
15. Mussman, 289 Ga. at 588, 713 S.E.2d at 824; see also O.C.G.A. § 17-5-56(a) (2008
& Supp. 2012).
16. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-56(a).

17.
18.
19.
56(a).
20.

Mussman, 289 Ga. at 588, 713 S.E.2d at 824.
Id. at 587, 713 S.E.2d at 823.
Id. at 589,713 S.E.2d at 824 (internal quotations omitted); see also O.C.GA. § 17-5Mussman, 289 Ga. at 589-90, 713 S.E.2d at 825.
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supreme court also held that the loss of the car did not violate the
defendant's due process rights because, contrary to the opinion below,
the loss was not the result of "bad faith."2 1 The court determined that
police released the car pursuant to established policy, and there was no
police conduct suggesting bad faith.22
IV. GRAND JURY INDICTMENTS
In a case of first impression, the Georgia Court of Appeals concluded
that the Georgia legislature never intended for a special purpose grand
jury to have the power to return acriminal indictment, thereby vacating
the indictment returned by a Gwinnett County special purpose grand
jury.2" In Kenerly v. State,' the trial court, upon a petition from the
Gwinnett County District Attorney, impaneled a special purpose grand
jury to investigate the acquisition of real property by the Gwinnett
County Board of Commissioners.25 The special purpose grand jury was
properly impaneled pursuant to the authority set forth in O.G.G.A. § 1512-100,26 which specifically authorizes the impaneling of a special
purpose grand jury "forthe purpose of investigatingany alleged violation
of the laws of this state or any other matter subject to investigation by
grandjuries as provided by law."27
After conducting more than a year-long investigation, the special
purpose grand jury returned an indictment against Kenerly, a Gwinnett
County commissioner, charging him with one count of bribery and two
counts of failing to disclose financial interest. Kenerly objected to the
court upheld the special purpose grand
indictment; however, the trial
28
jury's authority to return it.
The Georgia Court of Appeals analyzed the language of the statute
governing special purpose grand juries and O.C.G.A. § 15-12-71,21 the
statute setting forth the authority and responsibilities of a regular grand
jury.30 The appellate court noted, first, that O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100 had
no language "giving a special purpose grand jury the power to return a

21. Id. at 591, 713 S.E.2d at 825-26.
22. Id.
23. Kenerly v. State, 311 Ga. App. 190, 190, 715 S.E.2d 688, 689 (2011).
24. 311 Ga. App. 190, 715 S.E.2d 688 (2011).
25. Id. at 190-91, 715 S.E.2d at 689.
26. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-100 (2012).
27. Kenerly, 311 Ga. App. at 191, 715 S.E.2d at 690 (emphasis in original); see also
O.C.GA § 15-12-100.
28. Kenerly, 311 Ga. App. at 191, 715 S.E.2d at 689-90.
29. O.C.GA § 15-12-71 (2012).
30. Kenerly, 311 Ga. App. at 191-93, 715 S.E.2d at 690-91.
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criminal indictment." 1 Second, the court of appeals relied upon "the
venerable principle of the maxim 'expressum facit cessare taciturn," that
the legislature's deliberate omission of the special grand jury's authority
to return indictments-which is expressly conferred upon the regular
grand juries in O.C.G.A. § 15-12-71-required the court to conclude that
3
such authority cannot be exercised by the special purpose grand jury."
The indictment could not stand.
The two-bite rule saved the day in State v. Dempsey.34 Pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-53.1,"' the State has the proverbial "two-bites" in grand
jury presentation. 6 This statute directs that if two true-bills pertaining to the same offense are returned by a grand jury and are quashed by
motion or demurrer, this "shall be a bar to any future prosecution of
[the] defendant" for that offense. 7 Dempsey was indicted for murder
and a number of accompanying charges arising out of his having shot
Crane following a longstanding property dispute between the two.88
The defense argued a motion to quash this indictment because the grand
jury foreman was an elected member of the city council, and under
O.C.G.A. § 15-12-60(b)," any elected 40local government official is
prohibited from serving on a grand jury.

The trial court, erroneously, did not grant the motion to quash but did
order the city councilman be removed from the grand jury." The next
day, the district attorney presented the case again to the grand jury-this
time without the city councilman on the panel and without presenting
any evidence. Relying entirely upon the evidence the grand jury heard
in support of their first consideration of the matter, they returned a
second indictment, charging4 2Dempsey with the same offenses for which
he was previously indicted.
A second motion to quash was filed, which the trial court granted,
because the "grand jury has no right to find any bill... except upon the

31. Id. at 193, 715 S.E.2d at 691.
32. Id. at 193-94, 715 S.E.2d at 691-92;
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

see also O.C.GA. § 15-12-71.
Kenerly, 311 Ga. App. at 190, 715 S.E.2d at 689.
290 Ga. 763, 727 S.E.2d 670 (2012).
O.C.GA. § 17-7-53.1 (2008).
Id.
Id.
Dempsey, 290 Ga. at 763-64, 727 S.E.2d at 671-72.
O.C.G.A. § 15-12-60(b) (2012).
Dempsey, 290 Ga. at 764, 727 S.E.2d at 672; see also O.C.GA § 15-12-60(bXl).
Dempsey, 290 Ga. at 765, 727 S.E.2d at 672-73.
Id. at 764-65, 727 S.E.2d at 672.
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testimony of a witness . . . ."
The defense argued the trial court's
failure to properly grant its first motion to quash was a critical error
because the two-bite rule would mean the State was precluded from a
third shot at grand jury presentation. The trial court's rationale for
denying the first motion to quash was based solely upon timing."
Relying upon the rule that prevailed for many years, a challenge to the
composition of the grand jury had to be made "before the indictment was
returned," unless the defendant could show he was without actual or
constructive knowledge of the illegality of the grand jury's composition.45
The defense, relying upon the 2003 amendment to O.C.G.A. § 17-7100, 46 which reads, "[a]ll pretrial motions, including demurrers and
special pleas, shall be filed within ten days after the date of arraignment," necessarily expanded the timeframe for the filing of a motion to
quash predicated upon the composition of the grand jury.47 The
Georgia Supreme Court agreed, and, in doing so, overruled the line of
cases holding onto the timing exception that had been carved out for
challenges to the composition of the grand jury.4' Now, the Georgia
Supreme Court holds the legislature's command that "all" pretrial
motions
must be filed within ten days of arraignment does, indeed, mean
"all." 49
Because the trial court should have granted the first motion to
quash-in that it was timely filed within ten days after arraignment, it
was meritorious in that the grand jury was illegally comprised of a
sitting elected local official, and the second indictment was properly
quashed as having been returned without any witness having testified-the State had taken its two bites, and it was forever barred from
seeking another indictment against Dempsey for this offense.5"

43. Id. at 766, 727 S.E.2d at 673 (quoting State v. Williams, 181 Ga. App. 204,205,351
S.E.2d 727, 729 (1986)).
44. Id. at 764-65, 727 S.E.2d at 672.
45. Id. at 765, 727 S.E.2d at 672.
46. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-100 (2008).
47. Dempsey, 290 Ga. at 765, 727 S.E.2d 672-73; see also O.C.G.A. § 17-7-110.
48. Dempsey, 290 Ga. at 765, 727 S.E.2d at 672-73 (overruling Sanders v. State, 235
Ga. 425, 219 S.E.2d 768 (1975); Simmons v. State, 226 Ga. 110, 172 S.E.2d 680 (1970);
Folds v. State, 123 Ga. 167, 51 S.E. 305 (1905)).
49. Id. at 765, 727 S.E.2d at 673; see also O.C.G.A. § 17-7-110.
50. Dempsey, 290 Ga. at 767-68, 727 S.E.2d at 674.
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V.

DEMURRERS

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution 5' played an
important role in constitutional challenges to criminal statutes this
reporting period. In Final Exit Network, Inc. v. State,5" the Georgia
Supreme Court accepted review of the trial court's denial of a demurrer
to the charge of offering to assist in the commission of suicide.53 In
1994, the legislature enacted O.C.G.A. § 16-5-5(b), 4 which criminalized
the offer to assist another in the commission of suicide.5 5 The offense
was a felony, punishable for up to five years in prison. The challenge to
this statute was whether the behavior sought to be punished was
constitutionally protected free speech under the state and federal
constitutions.56
The statute specifically provides that "[a]ny person who publicly
advertises, offers, or holds himself or herself out as offering that he or
she will intentionally and actively assist another person in the commission of suicide and commits any overt act to further that purpose is
guilty of a felony .... " Because the statute has two components-(1)
the advertisement or offer to assist in the suicide and (2) the overt act
in furtherance of that purpose-in order for the crime to be committed,
the statute results in a "selective restraint on speech with a particular
content."58 Such a proscription necessarily means that the State has
decided to regulate speech as the result of its disagreement with the
message it conveys. The only way such a statute can be upheld is if it
satisfies a strict level of constitutional scrutiny, meaning the State must
demonstrate a compelling interest, coupled with proof that the statute
is narrowly drawn to serve that purpose.59
The State presented its case that the compelling interest was in the
prevention of suicide.60 The Georgia Supreme Court agreed this was
a compelling interest but held that the statute was not narrowly tailored

51.
52.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
290 Ga. 508, 722 S.E.2d 722 (2012).

53. Id. at 508, 722 S.E.2d at 723.
54. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-5(b) (2011 & Supp. 2012). For the purposes of this Survey, the
Authors and the case are referring to the law in effect in 2011.
55. FinalExit Network, Inc., 290 Ga. at 508, 722 S.E.2d at 723; see also O.C.G.A. § 165-5(b).
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

FinalExit Network, Inc., 290 Ga. at 508, 722 S.E.2d at 723.
O.C.G.A. § 16-5-5(b).
FinalExit Network, Inc., 290 Ga. at 508-09, 722 S.E.2d at 723.
Id. at 509, 722 S.E.2d at 723-24.
Id. at 509, 722 S.E.2d at 724.
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to serve that purpose. 6' The statute was "underinclusive," meaning it
did not ban all types of assisted suicide or all types of offers to assist in
the commission of suicide; instead, it banned onlypublic offers, designed
to prohibit "Dr. Kevorkian"-type assisters of suicide while leaving nonKevorkian-type assisters of suicide free to do so without criminal
sanction.6" This underinclusiveness led the supreme court to conclude
that the State failed to meet the high burden of strict scrutiny to justify
the "intrusion on protected speech rights." 3 The statute, therefore, was
stricken down as unconstitutional under the Georgia and United States
Constitutions."
Seven months earlier, the Georgia Supreme Court reviewed another
free speech challenge." In Haley v. State," the Georgia Bureau of
Investigation tracked down and arrested Andrew Haley after he created
and posted two videos on YouTube that were part of an online murder
mystery game.6" Haley, posting under the username "catchmekiller,"
wrote that he would post weekly videos, each with new clues that would
lead the viewers to the body of a missing murder victim so, "[o]nce all 16
bodies are found," he would "confess to 16 murders," and reveal his
location.6 8
The first video focused upon the case of Tara Grinstead, a schoolteacher who had been missing since 2005, and whose tragic disappearance
had drawn national attention.69 By the time Haley posted the second
video, law enforcement had already begun emailing and commenting on
the game, prompting Haley to admonish the "FBI agent" from intimidating him because "there's no way he's gonna find me."70 In addition to
the videos, Haley also posted a comment on his YouTube page concerning the disappearance of another young woman named Jennifer Kesse.
Sadly, Jennifer's father, who must have been scouring all possible leads
to locate his daughter, responded to Haley's comment, asking how he
could help. Haley referred Mr. Kesse to his "catchmekiller" website.
Kesse contacted law enforcement who, after reviewing the videos,

61. Id.
62. Id. at 510, 722 S.E.2d at 724 (quoting Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct.
2729, 2740 (2011)).

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at 511, 722 S.E.2d at 725.
Haley v. State, 289 Ga. 515, 516, 712 S.E.2d 838, 839 (2011).
289 Ga. 515, 712 S.E.2d 838 (2011).
Id. at 516, 712 S.E.2d at 839.
Id. at 516, 712 S.E.2d at 839-40 (alteration in original).
Id. at 517, 712 S.E.2d at 840.
Id.
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suspected the "catchmekiller" was a significant lead in Tara Grinstead's
death.71
Haley was located through his IP address, arrested, and indicted for
the offenses of false statement, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-10-20, 72 and
tampering with evidence, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-10-94. 78 Haley was
convicted on both counts. 4 Haley challenged the false statement
statute on its face and as applied, as violating the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution as well as article I, section 1, paragraph
5 of the Georgia Constitution,7 both of which protect his right to free
speech.76 Haley argued the false statement statute requires only two
elements of proof: (1) that the defendant knowingly and willfully makes
a false statement; and (2) that the false statement is a matter within the
jurisdiction of state or local law enforcement.7 ' Had the defense
analysis been correct, Justice Nahmias, writing for the court, acknowledged that there would be a valid free speech challenge because many
people lie about "a wide variety of subjects from the serious to the
mundane," and given the expansion of our state and municipal codes,
"almost every aspect of modern life" could fall within the jurisdiction of
a state or local department or agency.7 The First
Amendment would,
79

necessarily, strike down such a broad

statute.

But, the supreme court concluded, Haley's consruction of the statutory
elements of the false statement statute was flawed.80 The "knowingly
and willfully" language of the statute must be read to modify both the
making of the false statement and the contemplation or expectation that
the statement will come to -the attention of an affected state or local
agency.8 ' This construction was reasonable, the court held, given its
first rule of statutory construction, which is to search for the most
reasonable interpretation in hopes of saving a statute from unconstitu82
tionality.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 517-18, 712 S.E.2d at 840.
O.C.G.A. § 16-10-20 (2011).
Haley, 289 Ga. at 518-19, 712 S.E.2d at 840-41; O.C.G.A. § 16-10-94 (2011).
Haley, 289 Ga. at 515, 712 S.E.2d at 839.
GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 5.
Haley, 289 Ga. at 519, 712 S.E.2d at 841.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 519-20, 712 S.E.2d at 842.
Id. at 521, 712 S.E.2d at 843.
Id.
Id. at 521-22, 712 S.E.2d at 843.
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Second, the construction was also reasonable, given its statutory
8 3
history.
The Georgia false statement statute was taken directly from
the older federal false statement statute.84 For that reason, Georgia
courts could look to the federal interpretations of the law which, many
circuits have held, require that the person making the false statement
must have intended "that it shall bear a relation or purpose as to some
matter which is within the jurisdiction of a department or agency" of the
government.85 As the Georgia statute was modeled after the federal
statute, the federal decisions construing that federal statute are a "good
guide"8 as to how we must imagine the Georgia General Assembly
intended the statute to be interpreted.
For those reasons, the court held, the false statement statute
withstands First Amendment scrutiny because the statute requires proof
that the person who intentionally makes the false statement "to have
made the false statement in some intended relationship to a matter
within the state or local agency's jurisdiction, that is, to have contemplated that it would come to the attention of an agency with the
authority to act on it." 7
In State v. Outen,88 the Georgia Supreme Court clarified the procedure that must be adhered to in order for the State to appeal from the
granting of a demurrer in a multi-count indictment.9 Outen was
indicted by a Clarke County grand jury for two counts of vehicular
homicide. Outen filed a special demurrer to count one that was granted
by the trial court. The State filed a direct appeal of that order to the
Georgia Court of Appeals, which afirmed the trial court. The State
petitioned for certiorari, which was granted by the supreme court,
though not for the reason the State had sought certiorari.9"
The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify that the
Georgia Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction in the first place to have
accepted the matter on appeal.91 O.C.G.A. § 5-7-192 gives the State

83. Id. at 523-24, 712 S.E.2d at 844.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 525, 712 S.E.2d at 845 (quoting Ebeling v. United States, 248 F.2d 429, 434
(8th Cir. 1957)).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 527, 712 S.E.2d at 847. The supreme court did reverse Haley's conviction on
the second charge of tampering with evidence, as there was insufficient proof that Haley
had the "specific intent" to prevent the apprehension or obstruct the prosecution of another,
which is a required element of proof for the offense. Id. at 516, 712 S.E.2d at 839.
88. 289 Ga. 579, 714 S.E.2d 581 (2011).
89. Id. at 579, 714 S.E.2d at 582.
90. Id. at 579-80, 714 S.E.2d at 582.
91. Id. at 579, 714 S.E.2d at 582.
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the right to appeal from an order dismissing an indictment, such as an
order granting a special demurrer.93 However, the procedure for
appealing from the dismissal of a count in a multi-count indictment is
controlled by O.C.G.A. § 5-7-2," which requires that if the order of
dismissal is not a final order (meaning, there are counts remaining to be
tried), then the State needs to follow the steps required for obtaining a
certification for immediate review from the trial judge within ten days
of the decision.9 5 In other words, no direct appeal can be taken from
a non-final order, meaning, without a proper certificate of immediate
review, the court of appeals was without jurisdiction to have even
considered the State's appeal to the trial court's 96
order granting the
indictment.
two-count
the
of
count
one
to
demurrer
While the decision seems obvious, it is significant because in holding
as the court did, it was necessary for the supreme court to strike down
a line of cases97 that were "wrongly decided," in that they had permitted direct appeal from an order dismissing a single count of a multi98
count indictment.
VI. SPEEDY TRIAL
In either an isolated breakdown of the indigent due process mechanism or, at worst, a presage of future calamity brought about by budget
shortfall, Phan v. State99 highlights systemic problems in our state's
indigent defense delivery system. This second pre-trial appeal (the first,
PhanI, found a "systemic breakdown" in the public defender system and
remanded the pre-trial issue to trial court for an analysis of whether a
"speedy trial" violation had, in fact, occurred)0 0 determined that
despite the State being unable to continue to provide for long-time
counsel and supplanting that counsel with new attorneys, no "speedy
trial" violation occurred.10 '
Phan was accused of executing a man and his two-year-old son in late
2004. The State, for budgetary reasons, placed a hold on the compensa-

92. O.C.G.A. § 5-7-1 (1995 & Supp. 2012).
93. Id.
94. O.C.G.A. § 5-7-2 (1995 & Supp. 2012).
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Outen, 289 Ga. at 581, 714 S.E.2d at 583.
97. State v. Ramirez-Herrara, 306 Ga. App. 878, 703 S.E.2d 429 (2010); State v.
Barrett, 215 Ga. App. 401, 451 S.E.2d 82 (1994); State v. Tuzman, 145 Ga. App. 481, 243
S.E.2d 675 (1978).
98. Outen, 289 Ga. at 581, 714 S.E.2d at 583.
99. 290 Ga. 588, 723 S.E.2d 876 (2012).
100. Phan v. State, 287 Ga. 697, 699 S.E.2d 9 (2010).
101. Phan,290 Ga. at 588-89, 723 S.E.2d at 878-79.
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tion and expenses of Phan's attorneys in April 2009. The trial court
eventually removed Phan's attorneys from the case, placing it in the
hands of the Georgia Public Defenders Standards Counsel's Capital
Defenders division. The trial court then proceeded to find there was no
speedy trial violation resulting from these actions and delays. 102
The Georgia Supreme Court, in reviewing the actions of the trial court,
held that under the framework established in Barker v. Wingo, °3 no
speedy trial violation had occurred.' 0 ' The trial court incorrectly held
responsibility for the delay against the defense because both parties
were partially responsible according to the supreme court. °5 Yet, after
weighing all of the Wingo factors, the court held that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss based on
speedy trial grounds." 6 The court further held that no Sixth or
Fourteenth Amendment rights were denied by the replacement of
defense counsel. 107 Citing Davis v. State,' s the court reiterated
there is no right for the State to appoint counsel of the defendant's
choosing.109

While Phan did not win his appeal on the alleged violation of his right
to a speedy trial, the supreme court strongly addressed the problems
highlighted in this case and inherent in the indigent defense system in
the opinion:
[Our holding] should in no way be construed as an endorsement of the
system that has led us down this tortuous path thus far. The interests
of no one-neither prosecutors nor defendants, victims nor taxpayers-are served by the uncertainty and delay attending to a chronically
underfunded indigent defense system. This case is an object lesson in
the perils of such underfunding; the fact that the dismissal of murder
charges has had to be legitimately considered for reasons so far
removed from the accused's guilt or innocence underscores the stakes
involved. We can only hope that those within the branches of government empowered to remedy these institutional problems will make it
a priority to do so."

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 589-92, 723 S.E.2d at 879-81.
407 U.S. 514 (1972).
Phan, 290 Ga. at 589, 592-93, 723 S.E.2d at 878-79, 881.
Id. at 596-97, 723 S.E.2d at 884.
Id.
Id. at 597-98, 723 S.E.2d at 884-85.

108. 261 Ga. 221, 403 S.E.2d 800 (1991).
109. Phan,290 Ga. at 597, 723 S.E.2d at 884.
110. Id. at 598-99, 723 S.E.2d at 885.
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VII.

STANDARD OF PROOF FOR MENTAL RETARDATION

In Stripling v. State,"' the Georgia Supreme Court ruled, among
other issues, that Georgia's statutorily defined standard of proof for a
defendant to show mental retardation is constitutional. 2 Alphonso
Stripling, after shooting four co-workers, two of whom were killed, was
sentenced to death,"'
On a habeas corpus petition, the Georgia
Supreme Court held that the State had suppressed favorable information
regarding Stripling's alleged mental retardation and ordered a retrial as
to the sentencing phase." 4 This interim appeal arose therefrom.
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131" requires defendants to prove they are mentally retarded beyond a reasonable doubt."" The Georgia Supreme Court
reasoned that although mentally retarded, defendants have a constitutional right to be exempt from the death penalty, the states are free to
determine the methodology by which defendants are determined to be
mentally retarded. 11 7 In defense of the standard of proof itself, the
court noted that the United States Supreme Court counted Georgia
among a national consensus of states regarding the treatment of
mentally retarded defendants."'
Using this rationale, the court
concluded that if the highest court in the country counts Georgia among
a consensus in the field, then the burden of Georgia's standard itself
cannot be beyond the pale." 9
VIII.

SUPPRESSION

On August 19, 2008, Gwinnett County Police officers were walking
through a parking lot on their way to dinner when they observed Raul
Canino recklessly speed through the parking lot through which they
were walking. These officers approached Canino after he parked, and
after running an information check, placed Canino under arrest for
reckless driving. Simultaneously, Canino's car was searched by another
officer on the scene. The search produced a large amount of cocaine. As
the search concluded, friends of Canino approached the scene and were

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
(2002)).
119.

289 Ga. 370, 711 S.E.2d 665 (2011).
Id. at 371, 711 S.E.2d at 667.
Id. at 370, 711 S.E.2d at 667.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131 (2008 & Supp. 2012).
Id.
Stripling, 289 Ga. at 371-72, 711 S.E.2d at 668.
Id. at 373, 711 S.E.2d at 668-69 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314-15
Id. at 374, 711 S.E.2d at 669.
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available to take possession of Canino's vehicle, but police impounded
the vehicle instead. Canino was charged with reckless driving and
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The defense sought to
suppress the evidence found as a result of the search. 2 °
Before the trial court ruled on the motion to suppress, the State moved
to reopen the evidence in light of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Arizona v. Gant,' which ruled that a search of a vehicle
incident to a lawful arrest is only proper where the arrestee is unsecured
and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment, or when
evidence of the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.'22 In
March 2010, the Georgia Supreme Court held that even a search in
violation of Gant could yield admissible evidence under the inevitable
discovery rule if the vehicle would be subject to an inventory search. 2 '
In Canino v. State,'" the Georgia Court of Appeals determined that
both the search of the vehicle after the defendant's arrest was improper
and the State's argument for inevitable discovery via an inventory
search was without merit. 25 The court in Gant held that "to allow
vehicle searches incident to any arrest would serve no purpose except to
provide a police entitlement, and it is anathema to the
Fourth Amend12 6
ment to permit a warrantless search on that basis."
In Boykins v. State,'2 7 the Georgia Supreme Court established state
precedent for the rule in Gant.12 1 In Canino, the State did not contend
that the police believed the vehicle contained evidence of the crime of
arrest but rather that the defendant was not secured.129 The court of
appeals dismissed this claim, holding that "although Canino was in close
proximity to the interior of his vehicle, if he was in handcuffs during the
search, it was an improper search incident to arrest under Gant and
Boykins."" °
In determining the inevitable discovery through an inventory search
argument to be without merit, the court of appeals held that impoundment of a vehicle is proper only if there is some necessity on the part of

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Canino v. State, 314 Ga. App. 633, 634-35, 725 S.E.2d 782, 784-85 (2012).
556 U.S. 332 (2009).
Canino, 314 Ga. App. at 635, 725 S.E.2d at 785.
Id. at 635-36, 725 S.E.2d at 785.
314 Ga. App. 633, 725 S.E.2d 782 (2012).
Id. at 641, 725 S.E.2d at 789.
Gant, 556 U.S. at 347.
290 Ga. 71, 717 S.E.2d 474 (2011).
Id. at 72-73, 717 S.E.2d at 475-76.
Canino, 314 Ga. App. at 638, 725 S.E.2d at 787.
Id. at 638-39, 725 S.E.2d at 787-88.
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law enforcement to take charge of the property.13 The court explained
that because Canino's car was legally parked in the lot and, should the
need arise, a friend was available to take charge of the property on
Canino's behalf, there was no necessity for the police to take possession
of the car.'32 Without rightful possession by law enforcement, the
contraband would never have been discovered in Canino's automo133
bile.
Another recent case concerning the periphery of the law regarding
search incident to arrest is Hawkins v. State."
In Hawkins, the
defendant was arrested after she traded text messages with an
undercover police officer for the purpose of purchasing drugs from the
police officer. A meeting was set up, and when Haley Hawkins arrived
at the location, she sent a text message to the nearby police officer who
subsequently arrested Hawkins. After the arrest, the officer found
Hawkins's cell phone, searched it for incriminating text messages, and
then downloaded and printed them.'35
Under Gant, an officer can search the passenger compartment of an
arrestee's vehicle when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the
crime can be found therein. 36 Here, Hawkins was arrested as she sat
in her car awaiting her meeting, with her cell phone in her possession. 3 ' Having observed Hawkins texting before the arrest as she sat
in her car, the arresting officer had a reasonable belief that the car
contained evidence of Hawkins's intent to purchase drugs.13 8 The
court also held that "a cell phone is 'roughly analogous' to a container,"
and, as such, can be opened and searched for evidence of a crime.131
Since a cell phone can potentially contain vast amounts of personal data,
the supreme court, echoing the court below, 40 stated that appropriate
guidance regarding the scope of the search of the cell phone incident to
arrest must be limited to the objects of the search.' 4 '

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 640, 725 S.E.2d at 788.
Id. at 641, 725 S.E.2d at 789.
Id.
290 Ga. 785, 723 S.E.2d 924 (2012).
Id. at 785, 723 S.E.2d at 925.
Gant, 556 U.S. at 343-44.
Hawkins, 290 Ga. at 786, 723 S.E.2d at 925.
Id.
Id.
Hawkins v. State, 307 Ga. App. 253, 704 S.E.2d 886 (2010).
Hawkins, 290 Ga. at 787-88, 723 S.E.2d at 926.
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REASONABLE SUSPICION AND ROADBLOCKS

While operating a roadblock, a Georgia State Trooper noticed a car
pull into the parking lot of an abandoned shopping center just before the
roadblock. While on his way to investigate, another driver pulled into
the parking lot just before the trooper. The trooper used his vehicle to
block the exit while he got out to talk to the first driver. The first driver
gave a satisfactory answer as to why she pulled into the parking lot, and
the trooper decided to release her, but not before he asked the second
driver, Michael Jones, why he pulled into the parking lot. The trooper
smelled marijuana and alcohol coming from Jones's vehicle. The trooper
while he unblocked the exit for the
asked Jones to stay where he 4was
2
first driver to leave the scene.

In Jones v. State,'" the question before the Georgia Supreme Court
was whether Jones was seized without reasonable suspicion of unlawful
activity when his car was blocked from leaving the parking lot.' The
court ruled that Jones was at least temporarily seized when the trooper
blocked him from leaving the parking lot.' 5 For a traffic stop to be
valid, the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the individual
is engaged in criminal activity. 4" At the hearing on the motion to
suppress, the trooper did not testify to any particularized facts that led
him to suspect Jones was committing a crime.4 7 The court further
determined that there was no evidence Jones had violated any traffic
Without any particulaw or appeared to be evading the roadblock.'
larized reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the court ruled that the
seizure of Jones was invalid and the evidence should have been
suppressed. 4 9
X.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

In Johnson v. State,50 the Georgia Supreme Court held that the
defendant was not provided with effective assistance of counsel-in
particular, that the defendant was not advised regarding the potentiali-
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144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Jones v. State, 291 Ga. 35, 36, 727 S.E.2d 456, 457 (2012).
291 Ga. 35, 727 S.E.2d 456 (2012).
Id. at 35-36, 727 S.E.2d at 457.
Id. at 38, 727 S.E.2d at 459.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 38-39, 727 S.E.2d at 459.
289 Ga. 532, 712 S.E.2d 811 (2011).
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Jessie
ties and consequences of his failure to accept a plea offer.'
James Johnson was indicted for armed robbery, assigned a public
defender, assigned a second public defender as a replacement for the
first who subsequently became chronically ill, and was then assigned a
third public defender to enter a not-guilty plea at the docket call. The
second attorney, Mark Castro, was able to re-assume representation and
first met Johnson eight days before trial. At a meeting two days before
trial, Castro informed Johnson that an alibi defense could not be
established and, if convicted, Johnson would face a mandatory sentence
of life without parole. At that point Castro first discussed the State's
plea offer. Johnson accepted the offer, but when Castro went to convey
the acceptance to the assistant district attorney on the case the plea
offer was considered rejected. A standing policy in the district attorney's
office was that a plea is considered rejected when a defendant pleads not
guilty, and Johnson's plea offer, likewise, was rejected. 5"
The Georgia Supreme Court, applying Strickland v. Washington,53
held that Johnson showed that trial counsel was deficient and that he
was prejudiced by that deficiency.' 5 '
[it is clear that Johnson was not reasonably represented by any
attorney during the plea bargaining process.... [m1t is apparent that
no one from the public defender's office went to the State on Johnson's
behalf to negotiate a plea deal prior to the entry of a not guilty plea at
the docket call.'
Counsel's inability to provide timely and accurate advice to the
defendant during the critical pre-trial stages constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel, and the case was remanded to the trial court.'5 6
XI.

VoiR DIRE

In Osborn v. State,' Osborn was tried and convicted in Towns
County, Georgia. Jury selection began at the courthouse but was moved
to a local church after there was a bomb threat at the courthouse.
Osborn objected to the move, asserting a violation of the separation of
church and state. The trial court overruled the objection. 5 '

151. Id. at 536, 712 S.E.2d at 814.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 532-33, 712 S.E.2d at 812.
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Johnson, 289 Ga. at 536, 712 S.E.2d at 814.
Id. at 534, 712 S.E.2d at 813.
Id. at 536, 712 S.E.2d at 814.
310 Ga. App. 856, 714 S.E.2d 406 (2011).
Id. at 857, 714 S.E.2d at 407.
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The convictions were overturned because O.C.G.A. § 15-6-18(cXl) 159
provides that "no criminal jury trial shall be conducted in such alternate
or additional facility without the consent of the accused."6 ° Even
without an objection, the Georgia Court of Appeals noted, the movement
of a jury trial to an alternative location without the express consent of
the defendant was not proper.'61 The judgment of the trial court was
reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial.'62
XII.

CHILD HEARSAY

A significant challenge to the constitutionality of the child hearsay
exception to the prohibition against the admissibility of hearsay was
presented in Hatley v. State.163
O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16,16 commonly
known as the Child Hearsay statute, permits statements made by a child
under fourteen years old, describing sexual or physical abuse perpetrated
on the child or in the child's presence, as an exception to the prohibition
against hearsay so long as the child is available to testify and the court
finds sufficient indicia of reliability.'65
Hatley was convicted of
aggravated child molestation, aggravated sodomy, and two counts of
sexual battery involving a three-year-old child. 66 Relying upon the
United States Supreme Court opinion in Crawford v. Washington,6 7
Hatley argued on appeal that Georgia's Child Hearsay statute was not
constitutional because the state was not required to call the child as a
witness. 8'
In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court held that testimonial
out-of-court statements violate the Confrontation Clause unless the
declarant is unavailable and the defendant had an earlier opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant.'69
Since Crawford, the Georgia
Supreme Court has defined "testimonial" to include statements the
declarant made to "government officers investigating a crime."7 0 The
Georgia Supreme Court agreed with the appellant that, based upon the

159. O.C.G.A. § 15-6-18(c)(1) (2012).
160. Osborn, 310 Ga. App. at 858, 714 S.E.2d at 407 (quoting Purvis v. State, 288 Ga.
865, 870, 708 S.E.2d 283, 286-87 (2011)); see also O.C.G.A. § 15-6-18(c)(1).
161. Osborn, 310 Ga. App. at 858, 714 S.E.2d at 407.
162. Id.
163. 290 Ga. 480, 722 S.E.2d 67 (2012).
164. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-16 (2010).
165. Id.
166. Hatley, 290 Ga. at 481 n.1, 722 S.E.2d at 69 n.1.

167.
168.
169.
170.

541 U.S. 36 (2004).
Hatley, 290 Ga. at 482, 722 S.E.2d at 70.
Id. at 482-83, 722 S.E.2d at 70.
Id. (quoting Lindsey v. State, 282 Ga. 447, 452, 651 S.E.2d 66, 71 (2007)).
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Crawford opinion and cases that further construed it, the Child Hearsay
Statute "cannot pass constitutional muster because it fails to put the
onus on the prosecution to put the child victim on the witness stand to
confront the defendant."' 71 In reaching this decision, the supreme
court had to overrule a fairly long line of cases challenging the constituThe new procedure for child
tionality of this hearsay exception.'
is that the prosecution must
§
24-3-16,
O.C.G.A.
hearsay, pursuant to
a child's hearsay statement
to
introduce
of
its
intent
notify the defense
and give the defense an opportunity to object.173

If an objection is

raised, the State must call the child to trial if it still wishes to introduce
that child's hearsay statement. 74 If the defense does not object, the
State can introduce the child's hearsay statement, presumably without
calling the child, so long as the trial court determines that the "circum7
stances of the statements provide sufficient indicia of reliability." 1
While significant in altering the constitutionality of this hearsay
exception, Hatley did not benefit from the challenge. The supreme court
held, given the weight of the evidence against Hatley, the constitutional
error was harmless. 76
XIII.

CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

In a creative challenge to the use of forensic expert supervisors at
trial, the Georgia Supreme Court in Disharoon v.State77 held that the
use of supervisors to testify to the actions of their subordinates can come
dangerously close to violating the Confrontation Clause."'8 In light of
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Builcoming v. New
Mexico,'79 the Georgia Supreme Court heard this case to analyze the
decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals. 80 In Bullcoming, the
Supreme Court threw out the expert testimony of a blood sample by an
The
analyst other than the one who performed the relevant tests.'

171. Id. at 483, 722 S.E.2d at 70-71.
172. Id. (overruling Williams v. State, 290 Ga. App. 841,660 S.E.2d 740 (2008); Howell
v. State, 278 Ga. App. 634, 629 S.E.2d 398 (2006); Starr v. State, 269 Ga. App. 466, 604

S.E.2d 297 (2004)).
173. Id. at 483-84, 722 S.E.2d at 71.
174. Id. at 484, 722 S.E.2d at 71.

175. Id.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 485, 722 S.E.2d at 71-72.
291 Ga. 45, 727 S.E.2d 465 (2012).
Id. at 46, 727 S.E.2d at 466.
131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
Disharoon,291 Ga. at 46, 727 S.E.2d at 466.
Id. at 47, 727 S.E.2d at 467 (citing Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709, 2715).
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absent analyst was also suspended from work. 8 2 The Supreme Court
found it significant that the analyst was not available for crossexamination as to either the methodology of acquisition, analysis, and
conclusions of the tests or to explain what sorts of behaviors led to the
analyst's suspension and whether those behaviors could, in some way,
contaminate the results of any tests.'" These factors, combined,
denied the defendant his confrontation right as to the evidence of the
blood sample, and, therefore, the evidence was ruled inadmissible.' 4
In Disharoon,the analyst in question merely observed one step in the
8 5 The Georgia
testing process as opposed to participating directly."
Supreme Court held that this specific fact pattern did not rise to the
level of testamentary detachment of Bullcorning; the analyst was a
supervisor who was present and engaged in all parts of the tests, and
the mere direction of another to perform an observed task does not break
the chain of testamentary capacity.8 6 Justice Nahmias warned in
concurrence that the ambiguity of this issue will most likely cause the
United States Supreme Court to further
refine where the line of the
187
Confrontation Clause lies in this area.
XIV.

OUT-OF-STATE SUBPOENAS

DiMauro v. State,' Davenport v. State, 8 9 Yeary v. State, 90 and
Spann v. State 9 ' are DUI cases involving similar appeals concerning
the defendants' attempts to subpoena persons and records of a Kentucky
corporation that manufactures the "Intoxilyzer 5000," the machine which
was used to administer breath tests to the defendants, so as to get the
machine's source code with which to challenge the test results.'92 In
each case, the request for the out-of-state subpoena made pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 24-10-90 (the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of
Witnesses from Without the State (the Uniform Act)) 93 was denied,

182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 47-48, 727 S.E.2d at 467.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 48, 727 S.E.2d at 468 (Nabmias, J., concurring).
188. 310 Ga. App. 526, 714 S.E.2d 105 (2011).
189. 289 Ga. 399, 711 S.E.2d 699 (2011).
190. 289 Ga. 394, 711 S.E.2d 694 (2011).
191. 310 Ga. App. 575, 713 S.E.2d 722 (2011).
192. Davenport,289 Ga. at 399, 711 S.E.2d at 700; Yeary, 289 Ga. at 394, 711 S.E.2d
at 695; DiMauro, 310 Ga. App. at 526-27, 714 S.E.2d at 106-07; Spann, 310 Ga. App. at
575, 713 S.E.2d at 722.
193. O.C.G.A. § 24-10-90 (2010).
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the defendant was convicted of DUI at a bench trial, and the Georgia
Court of Appeals affirmed' 94 The Georgia Supreme Court granted
certiorari to review the court of appeals's decision in Davenport and
Yeary to determine whether the court had erred in finding that
Davenport had failed to make a sufficient showing under the Uniform
Act that the out-of-state person was a necessary and material witness
to the case, 9 ' and whether, in Yeary, the court of appeals had erred in
concluding that a request for documents under the Uniform Act must be
made ancillary to a request for testimony from an out-of-state witness.19 All four of these cases were brought by William "Bubba" Head
and his law firm, and together they provide cogent litigation strategy to
challenge the reliability of the machine being widely used in Georgia
DUI prosecutions.
In Davenport, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that the trial court
must simply determine if the witness is "material" in considering
whether to issue a certificate under the Uniform Act."9 7 Counsel in
Davenport, and in all of these cases, sought testimony and documents
from the Kentucky manufacturer of the Intoxilyzer 5000.198 Out-ofstate subpoenas are sought under the Uniform Act where the out-of-state
judge determines whether the witness is "material." In the trial court
below, the in-state court required a showing of materiality. This
requirement was upheld by the court of appeals. 9 9 The supreme court
wrote, "[wie disapprove the Court of Appeals's repeated misreading of
the statutory scheme. It is the out-of-state judge who must decide
whether the sought-after witness is necessary and material, not the
requesting court in Georgia."2°
In Yeary, the Georgia Supreme Court held that, similarly, a request
for a certificate under the Uniform Act does not require the defendant
to name and identify the corporate agent through which the corporation
is to act.201 The court held that the corporation can choose its own

194. Davenport,289 Ga. at 399, 711 S.E.2d at 700; Yeary, 289 Ga. at 394, 711 S.E.2d
at 695; DiMauro, 310 Ga. App. at 527, 714 S.E.2d at 107; Spann, 310 Ga. App. at 575, 713
S.E.2d at 722.
195. Davenport,289 Ga. at 399, 711 S.E.2d at 700; Yeary, 289 Ga. at 394, 711 S.E.2d
at 695-96.
196. Yeary, 289 Ga. at 394, 711 S.E.2d at 695-96.
197. Davenport,289 Ga. at 401, 711 S.E.2d at 701-02.
198. Id. at 402, 711 S.E.2d at 702; Yeary, 289 Ga. at 394, 711 S.E.2d at 695-96;
DiMauro, 310 Ga. App. at 529, 714 S.E.2d at 108; Spann, 310 Ga. App. at 575, 713 S.E.2d
at 722.
199. Davenport,289 Ga. at 402, 711 S.E.2d at 702.
200. Id.
201. Yeary, 289 Ga. at 398, 711 S.E.2d at 698.

104

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

agent, and the failure to name that agent on the part of the defendant
does, in no way, affect the materiality of the request.2 °2 In keeping
with Davenport (decided on the same day), the court put the power in
the hands of the out-of-state judge to determine materiality, and here,
specifically, to determine if the failure to name an agent leads to a
material deficiency in the request.0 3
Spann and DiMauro, issued by the court of appeals in the wake of
Davenport and Yeary, both resulted in remand to the trial court to issue
out-of-state
subpoenas under the standard set by the Georgia Supreme
04
Court.

XV.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Until this reporting period, appellate review of a challenged jury
instruction that was first raised on appeal (meaning the trial lawyer
failed to object) was a hit-or-miss proposition-sometimes the court
accepted the challenge under the plain error standards of review;
sometimes the appellate court found that the issue was waived. In State
v. Kelly,205 the standard of review was clarified. Kelly was convicted
of felony murder; the underlying felony being the offense of theft by
receiving stolen property, vehicular homicide, theft by receiving, and hit
and run.2"' Though the opinion does not set forth the facts, it appears
that the victim, Warren Jacobs, was killed as the result of Kelly driving
recklessly after having stolen a car;2 7 it is unclear from the opinion
whether Jacobs was a passenger in the car that wrecked or whether
Jacobs was a pedestrian struck by 2Kelly
as he drove at night "without
08
headlights at a high rate of speed."

On a motion for a new trial, the trial judge (who had not been the
judge who presided over the trial) agreed with counsel that the trial
court failed to adequately instruct the jury that the predicate felony to
a felony murder charge must be either "dangerous per se or create
foreseeable risk of death" under the circumstances. 2 9 The defense had
not raised this objection at trial nor had defense counsel sought a

202. Id.
203. Id.
204. DiMauro,310 Ga. App. at 530,714 S.E.2d at 109; Spann, 310 Ga. App. at 576,713
S.E.2d at 723.
205. 290 Ga. 29, 718 S.E.2d 232 (2011).

206. Id. at 29, 718 S.E.2d at 233.
207. See id.
208. Id.
209. Id. (citing Ford v. State, 262 Ga. 602, 423 S.E.2d 255 (1992)).
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request to charge on this principle of law.21 A new trial was granted
and the State appealed.2 '
The Georgia Supreme Court first considered the appellate standard of
review.2 12 Relying on O.C.G.A. § 17-8-58(b),213 passed in 2007, failure to object to any portion of the charge precludes appellate review of
the jury instructions "unless such portion of the jury charge constitutes
plain error which affects substantial rights of the parties."214 Since
2007, the supreme court noted, this statute has been applied inconsistently, with some opinions conducting plain-error review of unobjected-to
jury instructions while in other opinions, appellate review was denied
with a finding that the issue had not been preserved by objection and,
therefore, was waived.215
Reversing those opinions which had construed O.C.G.A. § 17-8-58 to
find waiver in the absence of an objection to a jury instruction, the
supreme court held that "appellate review for plain error is required
whenever an appealing party properly asserts an error in jury instructions."2 16 In doing so, the Georgia Supreme Court looked for guidance
from the federal plain error rule.217 Seeing that the Georgia legislature, in passing O.C.G.A. § 17-8-58, adopted almost verbatim the
language of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b),21 which
provides for the review of all "plain errors that affect[] substantial
rights," the four-pronged federal standard for plain-error review was
expressly adopted as Georgia's method of plain-error review."' First,
there must be an error that was not purposefully waived by the
appellant. 220 Second, the error must be "obvious." 221 Third, it must be

210. Id. at 30, 718 S.E.2d at 234.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 30-31, 718 S.E.2d at 234.
213. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-58(b) (2008).
214. Id.
215. Kelly, 290 Ga. at 31-32, 718 S.E.2d at 234-35. Compare Collier v. State, 288 Ga.
756, 707 S.E.2d 102 (2011); Crawford v. State, 288 Ga. 425, 704 S.E.2d 772 (2011); Lacey
v. State, 288 Ga. 187, 695 S.E.2d 210 (2010); Higginbotham v. State, 287 Ga. 187, 695
S.E.2d 210 (2010); Hicks v. State, 287 Ga. 260, 695 S.E.2d 195 (2010) with Madrigal v.
State, 287 Ga. 121,694 S.E.2d 652 (2010); Thompson v. State, 286 Ga. 889,692 S.E.2d 379
(2010); Hatcher v. State, 286 Ga. 491, 690 S.E.2d 174 (2010); Metz v. State, 284 Ga.614,
669 S.E.2d 121 (2008).
216. Kelly, 290 Ga. at 32, 718 S.E.2d at 235.
217. Id. at 33, 718 S.E.2d at 235; see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
218. FED. R. CRIm. P. 52(b).
219. Kelly, 290 Ga. at 33, 718 S.E.2d at 235; see also FED. R. CRIM P. 52(b).
220. Kelly, 290 Ga. at 33, 718 S.E.2d at 235-36.
221. Id. at 33, 718 S.E.2d at 236.
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shown that the error "affected the outcome" of the trial.222 And fourth,
if all three preceding prongs are satisfied, the appellate court should
remedy the error if the error "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity
or public reputation of judicial proceedings."2" The Authors are hardpressed to imagine a situation in which the first three prongs are
satisfied but the fourth is not because if an "obvious" error "affected the
outcome" of the trial, it must be the case that judicial fairness and
integrity had been compromised which, necessarily, must be corrected.
As for Kelly, the new standard was applied and his jury instructions
were reviewed, but the supreme court found that the omission of an
"inherently dangerous" nature of the predicate felony for a felony murder
conviction did not likely affect the outcome of the trial, and the order
granting him a new trial was reversed.2 '
XVI.

SENTENCING

The interpretation of the recidivist punishment statute, set forth in
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7,2" was the basis for two important opinions this
reporting period. In State v. Slaughter,28 Frederick Slaughter was
convicted of armed robbery, attempted murder, and possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon. In support of the charge of possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon, the prosecutor presented evidence of
Slaughter's three prior felony convictions. At sentencing, the trial
judge-relying upon those same three prior felony convictions-sentenced Slaughter as a recidivist to life in prison without
parole.22 7 Relying on King v. State,22 Slaughter challenged his
sentence, asserting that the state had "used up" the prior convictions as
evidence in his felon-in-possession charge, precluding their use in
sentencing.22 9 The argument was sound: in order to be sentenced to the
maximum, without parole, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(c), there had
to be three felony convictions left over after their use at trial to support
subsection (c) recidivist punishment. The Georgia Court of Appeals
agreed and vacated the sentence, sending it back to the trial court for

222. Id.
223. Id. (quoting Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)) (alteration in
original).
224. Id. at 34, 718 S.E.2d at 236.
225. O.C.GA. § 17-10-7 (2008 & Supp. 2012).
226. 289 Ga. 344, 711 S.E.2d 651 (2011).
227. Id. at 344, 711 S.E.2d at 651.
228. 169 Ga. App. 444, 313 S.E.2d 144 (1984).
229. Slaughter, 289 Ga. at 344-45, 711 S.E.2d at 651.
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resentencing."0 The State sought and was granted certiorari by the
Georgia Supreme Court to answer the question of the scope of the
holding in King as applied to subsection (c) recidivist punishment."'
The first-impression issue in King was a challenge to the State's use
of a defendant's prior felony conviction to support a felon-in-possessionof-a-firearm charge and then use that same conviction to seek recidivist
punishment under subsection (a) of O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 to require a
maximum punishment for the offense because the defendant had a prior
felony conviction.232 Such a result would make the sentencing scheme
of one to five years for this crime meaningless, as every felon in
possession would necessarily be subject to the maximum five years. 3
The Georgia Supreme Court now holds that King must be limited to
only those situations that fall under subsection (a) of § 17-10-7, relating
to recidivist punishment for a defendant with one prior felony conviction.2" ' When the question is raised, as applied to subsection (c),
relating to a defendant who has at least three prior felony convictions,
the analysis does not apply. 5 In that instance, the sentencing range
set forth by the legislature for the offense of felon-in-possession is not
eviscerated by subsection (c). 6 To the contrary, the sentencing range
is case-specific and defendant-specific.23 ' Therefore, using a prior
felony to support a felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm offense, and then
relying upon that same felony to support subsection (c) recidivist
sentencing, is not prohibited by the statute or case law.238

When recidivist punishment provisions include the discretion to
suspend or probate some portion of the sentence, the trial court must
exercise that discretion which, necessarily, requires that the trial court
understand under which circumstances the court has discretion to
exercise."' In Holland v. State,' the defendant was convicted of
shoplifting and sentenced to ten years in prison.2" The prosecutor,

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Id. at 344-45, 711 S.E.2d at 651-52.
Id. at 345, 711 S.E.2d at 652.
King, 169 Ga. App. at 444, 313 S.E.2d at 144.
Id. at 444, 313 S.E.2d at 144-45.
Slaughter,289 Ga. at 346, 711 S.E.2d at 652.
Id. at 346, 711 S.E.2d at 652-53.
Id.
Id.
Id. Slaughteroverrules Morrison v. State, 272 Ga. App. 34,611 S.E.2d 720 (2005),

and disapproves of any different conclusion that could be drawn from the opinion of
Campbell v. State, 279 Ga. App. 331, 631 S.E.2d 388 (2006). Slaughter, 289 Ga. at 346
nn.3-4, 711 S.E.2d at 653 nn.3-4.
239. Holland v. State, 310 Ga. App. 623, 629-30, 714 S.E.2d 126, 132 (2011).
240. 310 Ga. App. 623, 714 S.E.2d 126 (2011).
241. Id. at 623, 714 S.E.2d at 128.
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defense counsel, and trial court all believed that the convergence of
O.C.G.A. § 16-8-14(bX1)(C) 242 and O.C.G.A § 17-10-7(c) meant that the
court had no discretion other than the sentence it imposed.243 But, in
fact, the court did.2 "
Holland had three prior shoplifting convictions plus three prior felony
(non-shoplifting) convictions.2 "
O.C.G.A. § 16-8-14(b)(1)(C) is the
recidivist provision relating to repeat convictions for shoplifting, and
requires that the fourth conviction for shoplifting mandate a sentence of
one to ten years, any amount of which could be suspended or probated
except the first year.2' 6 The general recidivist provision of O.C.G.A.
§ 17-10-7(a) requires that anyone being sentenced for a felony who has
a prior felony conviction must be sentenced to the maximum sentence set
forth in the sentencing statute, but that any portion of the sentence
imposed can be probated or suspended.2 47 Subsection (c) of the general
recidivist sentencing statute provides that anyone convicted of a felony
that has at least three prior felony convictions must serve the maximum
time the judge provides in the sentence without the benefit of parole.2 "
Everyone involved in Holland's sentencing simply misunderstood that
the trial court had to sentence her to at least one year in prison (given
the specific recidivist punishment for shoplifting) and to the maximum
sentence of ten years (under subsection (a) of the general recidivist
statute), but any portion of that sentence (with the exception of the first
year) could be suspended or probated; however, whatever sentence
remained had to be served in prison without parole (under subsection (c)
of the general recidivist statute).2" As the trial court did not know it
could exercise that discretion, the case was remanded for resentenc25
ing.
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